Policy options and risks of an extension of the ECB’s quantitative easing programme: an analysis by Gerba, Eddie & Macchiarelli, Corrado
  
Eddie Gerba and Corrado Macchiarelli  
Policy options and risks of an extension of 
the ECB’s quantitative easing programme: 
an analysis 
 
Discussion paper [or working paper, etc.] 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Gerba, Eddie and Macchiarelli, Corrado (2016) Policy options and risks of an extension of the 
ECB’s quantitative easing programme: an analysis. IP/A/ECON/2016-01, PE 569.994. European 
Parliament, Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy, Brussels, Belgium. 
 
Originally available from European Parliament 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/68525/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: December 2015 
 
© 2016 European Parliament 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES 
POLICY DEPARTMENT A: ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy options and risks of an 
extension of the ECB’s quantitative 
easing programme: An analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
During the press conference on 3 December 2015, president Mario Draghi 
reiterated the readiness of the ECB to adopt additional measures in order to 
maintain an appropriate degree of monetary accommodation. Different options 
are available, including the increase in the amount of monthly purchases of 
assets, currently set at 60 billion EUR per month. However, there are risks 
involved in extending these asset purchase operations, including the renewed 
criticism against the ECB for not complying with its mandate and entering the 
fiscal financing territory. This paper reviews the available unconventional 
monetary policy options for the ECB and considers the potential risks involved 
with each. It also briefly discusses key credibility issues that ECB might eventually 
face. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
During the press conference on 3 December 2015, President Mario Draghi reiterated the 
readiness of the ECB to adopt additional measures in order to maintain an appropriate 
degree of monetary accommodation. Different options are available, including the increase 
in the amount of monthly purchases of assets, currently set at 60 billion EUR per month. 
However, there are risks involved in extending these asset purchase operations, including 
the renewed criticism against the ECB for not complying with its mandate and entering the 
fiscal financing territory. This paper reviews the available unconventional monetary policy 
options for the ECB and considers the potential risks involved with each. It also briefly 
discusses key credibility issues that ECB might eventually face. 
Even though bank lending in EA is slowly increasing as per the effect of QE, the level is still 
well below the level that would be needed to generate an improvement in the real activity. 
Recent evidence shows that the reason behind the low levels of (private sector) lending is 
the vastly growing volume of non-performing loans (NPLs).  
Zero lower bound interest rate and QE risk increasing the volume of NPLs, eroding bank 
profitability even further, reducing credit-to-GDP ratios, and therefore putting at stake any 
opportunities for contemporaneous or future growth. This, however, would largely depend 
on the future stance and design of QE and any accompanying measures. 
Regarding the practical extensions announced this December, there is a worry concerning 
the fact that the ECB has ventured below zero in June 2014. Should banks absorb the cost 
of holding money, this will risk making banks even less willing to lend. Liquidity constrained 
consumers and businesses might thus be the one suffering. 
The ECB has timidly loosened the self-imposed “issue” restriction not to own more than 
25% of any single bond. This (issue) limit has been brought to 33%. While this is an 
improvement, it is still not enough as QE purchases will still interact with previous 
acquisitions of bonds by the ECB or the NCBs, limiting the pace of purchases overall, 
particularly for some countries. 
The idea of extend the list of eligible collateral to include securities issued by regional and 
local governments would alleviate the scarcity problem. Overall, however, this would help 
simply buying time, but would not lead to the recovery of the euro area economies. The 
latter is by large a political decision. Indeed, local bonds from cities and municipalities have 
the fall back of central governments. Hence, the decision to put these bonds in the pot will 
possibly change the ECB’s balance sheet composition but not its intrinsic exposure to risk. 
We acknowledge that the ECB would still be able to consider 
 An extension of the current asset purchase programme beyond the current March 
2017 deadline 
 An increase in the pace of monthly purchases from 60 billion EUR per month at 
present 
 A change in the composition of asset purchases 
 A further cut in the (currently negative) deposit rate and the ECB lending rate; the 
latter not without risks, considering what outlined above.  
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The first point clearly underscores the risk of a prolonged monetary policy easing in a 
conventional sense, or the “how long” scenario, making exits strategies particularly 
relevant when the time will come. 
So far, the ECB’s action in non-standard mode was based on a principle of separation 
between the interest rate policy and recourse to exceptional measures. 
We see as a promising area the interaction of QE with fiscal expansion for the policy to 
succeed in stimulating aggregate demand and inflation. Overall, however, this interaction is 
not possible, especially in the presence of countries with limited fiscal space, in a 
framework which admits only limited risk sharing. 
We also discuss that other (complementary) options could be direct lending to banks and 
non-banks; amendments in the NPL regulation and foreign exchange interventions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2015, ECB officially started its extensive Asset Purchasing Programme (APP). The 
purchases amount to 60 billion EUR per month, and it was announced that the programme 
would run until at least September 2016. The aim of the QE was, as expressed by Mr Mario 
Draghi, to do whatever it takes to bring the core consumer-price-index (CPI) back to the 
2%-target. However, by November 2015, it became clear that the core CPI was still well 
below the ECB’s threshold. In fact, as Figure 1 shows, inflation has had hard time to even 
cross 1%. In light of this, and following the last Governing Council meeting of the ECB on 3 
December 2015, it was announced that the APP would be extended in scope, time, and 
possibly even size: in particular, the list of eligible collateral would be extended to include 
securities issued by regional and local governments, and the programme would be 
extended by at least 6 months until March 2017. At the same time, the deposit rate was 
cut further by 10 b.p., down to -0.30%, and President Draghi confirmed that the ECB is 
considering of increasing further the size of QE in the near future should inflation remain 
low (Financial Times, 5 January 2016).  
Figure 1: Euro Area CPI headline and 
CPI core developments 
(Annual % change) 
Figure 2: EA GDP growth rate 
 
Source: FT on Datastream data 
 
Source: Trading economics based on Eurostat  data 
In light of the deteriorating economic conditions in the euro area (EA), the effectiveness of 
QE is being brought into question; even more, now that different options of further 
monetary easing are being considered and their risks evaluated. In the remaining of the 
paper, we outline what these options are, discuss some of their economic, monetary and 
financial effects, as well as consider some of the risks entailed.  
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2. PROVISIONAL EVALUATION OF THE ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS OF QE: KEY EURO AREA INDICATORS 
Before discussing what further options the central bank holds in terms of reviving the 
economy, we should first evaluate the impacts of QE to date. The ECB has claimed it to be 
a success. Looking at the empirical evidence, as discussed before, the inflation rate has 
been in a steady decline since April 2015. By October same year, the rate even turned 
negative and has remained around the zero-level ever since (Figure 1). GDP growth rate 
for the area has started to contract once again since May last year, putting an end to the 
slow climb commenced in 2014 (Figure 2). 
Turning to bank lending, the downward trend observed above seems to hold. Even though 
bank lending in EA is slowly increasing, the level is still well below the level that 
would be needed to generate an improvement in the real activity. Using data from 
an ECB report in July (Figure 3), the largest share of the growth in the money supply (M3) 
over the past year and a half is accounted for by an increase in credit to the public sector, 
and not credit to the private sector, which is the one required instead in order to generate 
economic growth (Economonitor, 18 November, 2015). 
Figure 3: Contribution of the M3 counterparts to the annual growth rate of M3  
(percentage points) 
 
Source: European Central Bank 
A survey conducted by Commerzbank in October 2015 reveals a similar trend. They show 
that QE has had almost no effect on bank lending on balance. Roughly 85 per cent of banks 
said that QE has not increased lending and basically no bank saw a sizeable effect as the 
result of QE (Figure 4). The report concludes that liquidity is not a key factor that limits 
lending (Commerzbank Economic Research, 30 October 2015). In fact, the interest rates 
charged on loans are still relatively high despite a high liquidity on the market. 
Furthermore, the risk premium charged by banks is above 2 per cent despite the extremely 
low interest rates paid on deposits (Figure 5). 
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Figure 4: Impact of liquidity on loan supply decisions 
 
Source: Commerzbank based on ECB Bank Lending Survey 
Since lending to the private sector has been pointed out as the key factor for reviving 
growth in Europe, the question remains to why the costs of borrowing remain high for firms 
and households. Recent evidence (IMF, 2015; BIS; 2015) shows that the reason 
behind the low levels of (private sector) lending is the vastly growing volume of 
non-performing loans (NPLs) across the continent. For the EU as a whole, NPLs stood at 
over 9 per cent of GDP at the end of 2014, or 1.3 trillion EUR. This is more than double the 
level recorded in 2009. The volume is especially high for the peripheral EA countries, such 
as Portugal, Italy, Greece and Cyprus (Figure 6), and for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (Aiyar et al., 2015).  
 
Figure 5: Bank interest rates on new loans and deposits 
(percentages per annum) 
 
Source: Economonitor 
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Figure 6: Non-performing loans in Europe 
 
Source: IMF 
However, SMEs are exactly the firms that are most dependent on banks extending their 
loans. Moreover, those are firms generating around two-thirds of EU’s output and 
employment. This has serious implications for economic recovery since NPLs tend to reduce 
the credit-to-GDP ratio and GDP growth, while increasing unemployment (Espinoza and 
Prasad, 2010; Nkusu, 2011; Klein, 2013). In fact, high NPLs tie up bank capital that could 
otherwise be used to increase lending, leading to a reduction in bank profitability, a rise in 
funding costs and thus a reduction in credit supply overall (Figure 7; see also Aiyar et al., 
2015).  
Figure 7: Euro Area implications of high NPLs for bank performance (in 
percentage points) 
 
Source: Aiyar et al. (2015) 
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NPLs remain very persistent in the Euro Area, where the write-off rates for banks remain 
much lower than for US or Japanese banks. According to Aiyar et al. (2015), the reasons 
for that can be traced back to limited tax deductibility of provisions, weak debt enforcement 
and ineffective bankruptcy procedures that discourage write-offs and increase the cost of 
recovering assets provided as collateral for loans. Additional reasons are rigid accounting 
rules that hinder timely loss recognition and a lack of a sizeable market for distressed debt 
in Europe. The following diagram summarizes the results from an IMF survey, using a 
metrics where 1 equals ‘no concern’ and 3 reflects a high degree of concern for authorities 
and banks. From the survey, the specificities mentioned above for the EA countries are 
particularly evident (Figure 8).  
Figure 8: Survey-based scores on 
obstacles to NPLs resolution: EA 
vs non-EA 
Figure 9: Effect of change in the policy rate 
on bank profitability 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF survey of country authorities and 
banks 
 
Source: Borio et al. (2015) 
 
Likewise, a recent BIS study (Borio et al., 2015) shows that the impact of monetary policy 
rate on bank profitability declines with the level of interest rates and the slope of the yield 
curve (Figure 9). The results of the paper imply that unusually low interest rates and an 
unusually flat term structure erode indeed bank profitability.  
Bridging those two arguments, it means that the zero lower bound interest rate and 
QE, which intends to flatten the yield curve, risk increasing the volume of NPLs, 
eroding bank profitability even further, reducing credit-to-GDP ratios, and 
therefore putting at stake any opportunities for contemporaneous or future 
growth. This, however, would largely depend on the future stance and design of 
QE and any accompanying measures.  
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3. NEGATIVE INTEREST RATES, SO WHAT?  
By mid-November 2015, about a third of the debt issues by Euro Area governments had 
negative yields. That means that investors holding to maturity won’t get all their money 
back. Figure 10 illustrates that for ‘safe’ countries, almost the entire maturity spectrum of 
bonds trades at negative yields. If we take the shorter-end spectrum of debt, for instance 
2-year, we see that by November 2015, almost all European debt was trading negatively 
(Figure 11). Just a year earlier, only 5 countries’ debt traded below 0%. This could be seen 
as a success of the ECB policy, as QE aimed at lowering those yields and pushing investors 
out from the sovereign debt market.  
Figure 10: Euro Area bond maturities 
trading at negative yields in Nov 2015 
Figure 11: Two-Year Government Bond 
Yields for European Debt in Nov 2015 
 
Source: Bloomberg and The Economist 
 
But negative yields also expose the economy to certain risks. As we reminded in a previous 
note (Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2015a), extremely low government borrowing costs could 
result in misallocation of capital, which coupled with a weak currency could trigger capital 
flight and some asset values could collapse. Negative yields may also fail to boost 
economic growth if consumer and business confidence remain low. This is in 
particular true if consumer and business believe that the policy stance is 
ambiguous. In an environment of policy uncertainty, businesses will wait to invest and 
consumers will hoard money, resulting in low aggregate demand despite the negative 
yields. In September 2015, the CFA institute noted that dividends and repurchases 
amongst firms had recently exceeded capital spending, implying that large companies see 
little need for new productive capacity. At the same time, velocity of money continued to 
fall. Both are symptoms of an unsecure view of the future by firms and households (CFA, 7 
September 2015). This is supported by persistently high saving rates across the Eurozone, 
coupled with a high volatility of consumer confidence (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12: Euro Area Consumer Confidence 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Another obvious side effect of negative interest rates is that of pushing retirees and 
pension funds (and others requiring positive cash flow) to move into riskier segments of the 
market. Rather than accepting negative returns on government bonds, many fixed-income 
managers choose high(er)-yield bonds, emerging market debt, and high-dividend equities. 
Some observers are concerned this could result in a broad-based fixed-income asset bubble 
(CFA, 7 September 2015). 
3.1  IS AN EXTENSION OF THE PROGRAMME A GOOD IDEA? 
Mr. Draghi stated that the programme will possibly continue until at least March 2017 and, 
in any case, until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the inflation’s path, 
consistent with the ECB’s goal of achieving inflation rates close to, but below, 2% over the 
medium term.  
Figure 13: Survey of Professional 
Forecasters expectations 
Figure 14: Probability of expected long 
term inflation (deflation) 
 
Source: ECB Data. Last observation 2016Q1 Source: Bank of Finland (2015) 
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One of the ECB's top measures of long-term inflation expectations, the five-year, five-year 
euro zone breakeven forward EUIL5YF5Y has stabilized at around 1.7% recently after a 
rebound from a low below 1.5% in January (not shown here). Survey of Professional 
Forecasters’ expectations have generally remained stable as well in recent months, at 
around 1.8%, over the long horizon (5-year), whereas expectations at shorter horizons 
have improved (Figure 13). All in all, the decision to implement the ECB’ Asset Purchase 
Program seems to have indeed reduced tail risks of deflation, even if this trend has 
weakened over time, as the data for June vs. September in Figure 14 would suggest. The 
latter trend would be also possibly driven by weaker energy prices, as we reminded in a 
previous note. Notwithstanding some improvements in consumer sentiment and inflation 
expectations (particularly at shorter horizons), the ECB is dispelling any prospects of early 
tapering for now.   
Figure 15: Euro area main refinancing rate and deposit rate 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Regarding the practical extensions announced this December, there is a worry 
concerning the fact that the ECB has ventured below zero in June 2014, and now 
charges banks 0.3 percent to hold their cash overnight. Cutting the deposit rate 
further was indeed tailored to make more bonds eligible for QE purchases (Figure 15). In 
practice, however, there is a risk that the policy of cutting the deposit rate further, while 
unfreezing additional eligible bonds, might harm the money markets, and add to the 
existing uncertainty on lending (see also Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2015b). In fact, pushing 
the deposit rate lower implies banks may want to pass this cost and make more clients pay 
(rather than earn) an interest rate to hold their money, with the obvious side effect of 
clients preferring to hold cash instead. While that risk has not yet materialized – as banks 
have been reluctant to pass on negative rates for fear of losing customers – there is still a 
worry that when will banks absorb the cost of holding money on the books themselves, 
they will squeeze their profit margin between lending and deposit rates even further, giving 
themselves less of a cushion in case of a funding crunch. This risk making banks even less 
willing to lend, rather than more, as the policy of negative deposit rates was intended. 
Liquidity constrained consumers and businesses might thus be the one suffering 
(Bloomberg, 3 December 2015).  
The ECB has timidly loosened the self-imposed “issue” restriction not to own 
more than 25% of any single bond, thereby increasing its portfolio composition. By 
decision of the ECB’s Governing Council of 3 September 2015, this (issue) limit has been 
brought to 33%, “subject to a case-by-case verification” (ECB, 2016). By loosening the 
issue limit, possible OMTs and EAPP interactions would be a bit further down the line. 
Overall, however, there is a concrete risk that even a 33 per cent issue limit would leave 
barely any room for possible OMT purchases, in addition to the planned QE purchases. This 
is true especially for some peripheral euro area countries (Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2015b). 
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As the issue limit refers to the maximum share of a single PSPP-eligible security that the 
Eurosystem is prepared to hold, the agreed limit would thus make QE purchases interact 
with previous acquisitions of bonds by the ECB or the NCBs, limiting the pace of purchases 
overall. One of the main constraints in completely removing the issue limit is political. Said 
that, the latter can also be interpreted as a compromise between guarding the ECB’s 
credibility, while, at the same time, granting markets well-functioning. Some comments are 
warranted in Section 5. 
Finally, the last Governing Council’s decision of 3 December 2015 to extend the list 
of eligible collateral to include securities issued by regional and local 
governments would help relax some constraints on the current QE programme 
and release some of the collateral. Since QE purchases are determined on the basis of 
the ECB’s capital keys, some countries do most of the purchases. We have highlighted how 
for some large EA countries (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands) the short maturity spectrum 
is trading at negative rates, with a large proportion of bonds dipping below the ECB’s 
threshold of, now, -0.3 per cent. This leaves some central banks – the Bundesbank in 
primis – out of bonds to buy. Hence, the decision to accept regional and local governments’ 
bonds can enable these NCBs to reach the overall bond buying level more easily, alleviating 
the collateral scarcity problem. Overall, however, this would help simply buying time, 
but would not lead to the recovery of the euro area economies. The latter is by large 
a political decision. Indeed, local bonds from cities and municipalities have the fall back of 
central governments and typically enjoy lower credit rating than the latter. Hence, the 
decision to put regional and local governments’ bonds in the pot will possibly change the 
ECB’s balance sheet composition but not its intrinsic exposure to risk.  
While this decision may help balance the system, and support a softening of the scarcity 
bond problem by helping some rates – namely Germany’s – move back into green territory, 
this extension could also help “rejuvenate slack markets such as Italy or Spain”, a Reuters 
report says. In the latter case, however, benefits will be limited since regional borrowings 
will count in calculating a country's overall debt stock, hence issuances will generally be 
capped for countries with low fiscal space.  
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4. WHAT OTHER OPTIONS DOES THE EURO AREA HAVE?  
Taking into account these economic, monetary and market conditions, the key question 
becomes how the institutions will steer the Euro Area economies to growth? More 
specifically, what options do the ECB has at the moment, and what are the risks involved 
with each of those alternatives? 
The most obvious and straightforward options are to increase the size and scope of the 
current QE programme. This could be a combination of: 
 An extension of the current asset purchase programme beyond the current March 
2017 deadline 
 An increase in the pace of monthly purchases from 60 billion EUR per month at 
present 
 A change in the composition of asset purchases, perhaps to include the riskier 
corporate and high-yield bonds (possibly even to extend it into the territory of 
equities) and/or increasing purchase of bonds belonging to government agencies 
and/or expand the list of agencies eligible for QE (see also Gerba and Macchiarelli, 
2015b) 
 A further cut in the (currently negative) deposit rate and the ECB lending rate; the 
latter not without risks, considering what outlined above.  
The first point clearly underscores the risk of a prolonged monetary policy easing in a 
conventional sense, or the “how long” scenario (see also Reza et al. 2015), making exits 
strategies particularly relevant when the time will come (see Gerba and Macchiarelli, 
2015a, and Section 5). 
4. 1  JOINT MONETARY AND FISCAL STIMULUS 
It is understood that the most effective way of providing liquidity directly to households and 
businesses without generating new debt is by giving away “helicopter money”. However, 
since the ECB does not have a mandate to give money away directly to firms and 
consumers (just exchange one asset for another, in respect of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU), helicopter money (referred to as money creation to support 
aggregate demand) need to be backed by fiscal policy decisions (Grenville, 2013). 
In a recent article Bossone (2014) show that QE can, under strong liquidity preferences by 
the agents, fail to boost aggregate demand.1 While the programme will succeed in raising 
asset prices, under liquidity preference dominance, it will fail to stimulate consumption and 
investment since agents absorb any amounts of reserve money created by QE and hold 
onto them without changing their decision plans. Hence, the policy-induced reduction in the 
nominal interest rates on less liquid assets cannot be large enough to prop up the marginal 
utility from holding risky assets beyond that of consumption and money. They also show 
that the same failures will arise from negative interest rates, forward guidance, or 
monetary authority acting irresponsibly in the sense of Krugman (1998). Aiyar et al. 
conclude that at the zero-lower-bound with strong liquidity preferences, QE cannot work 
unless it is supported by fiscal policy.2 Thus, only the mix of monetary and fiscal stimulus 
can provide purchasing power directly to private and public agents.3  
                                                          
1 In an environment of secular stagnation, exceptions for growth become low and agents’ preference 
for liquidity high. 
2 At zero interest rate, long-term debt and liquidity are perfect substitutes and their marginal utility 
exceeds that of riskier assets. 
3 Since the budget deficit (generated by a fiscal stimulus) can be irreversibly funded through money 
creation, the government budget constraint is permanently relaxed by an equivalent amount. The 
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Monetary cum fiscal stimulus can resolve safety trap by boosting demand without creating 
public or private debt. 
QE must be accompanied by fiscal expansion to boost inflation and aggregate demand. 
However, in economies with large public debt, fiscal expansion would worsen the debt 
burden and thus neutralising the expansionary effects from a fiscal stimulus. Therefore, in 
order for the joint policy to succeed, the central bank should commit to hold permanently 
the debt purchased, so as to ‘neutralise’ forever the government and taxpayer obligations 
(see also Bossone, 2015). Some comments are warranted in Section 5. 
4.2  DIRECT LENDING 
A complementary (see also Section 5) way of boosting lending is for the central bank to 
lend directly to non-bank institutions or banks for a longer period of time (the latter along 
the lines of the already implemented Long Term Refinancing Operations – LTROs, for 
instance). Beyond what already discussed, cutting the ECB deposit rate risk indeed making 
banks reduce the exposure to the ECB to minimum. Hence, instead of increasing their 
lending to households and businesses, banks could respond by hoarding money or moving 
money to non-euro zone central banks. To avoid such scenario and get banks to lend more, 
the ECB may therefore need to wave “a lending carrot” (Reuters, 2014). This could be done 
in conjunction with QE, in respect of the separation principle between monetary policy and 
liquidity management.  
Lending to non-banks should only be done under some type of emergency function (so as 
to avoid it becoming permanent). An example of it could be Bank of England’s ‘Funding for 
Lending’ program. Under this, banks can exchange loans on their books for UK Treasury 
bills for up to four years. The aim is to push the banks to borrow against those Treasury 
bills to increase their lending. This strategy will be successful if lending is primarily driven 
by an inability of banks to access liquidity in private markets (Labonte, 2014). 
4.3  AMENDMENTS IN THE NPL REGULATION 
However, if the root of the problem is an increasing number of NPLs on banks’ balance 
sheet, then the remedy required to release that liquidity would be different. In that case, a 
comprehensive approach to accelerating NPL resolution is needed. The latter can be 
achieved if: 
 The ECB and national regulators tighten bank supervision 
 Structural reforms making bankruptcy more efficient and making it easier to collect 
debt are to be put in place 
 Markets for distressed assets are to be developed 
On the first point, a line of international experience shows that swift recognition of loan 
losses is crucial to incentivizing NPL resolution and corporate restructuring. On the one 
hand, more conservative provisioning and collateral valuation would encourage banks to 
resolve NPLs quickly. On the other hand, higher capital set aside by banks would make it 
easier to meet loan-restructuring targets within a reasonable period of time. In times of 
systemic crises, banks could agree with supervisors on standardized criteria to distinguish 
nonviable firms from viable ones. The first would require liquidation, while the second a 
simple restructuring (Aiyar et al., 2015).  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
disposable income of all agents can thus be equally raised, and because of Ricardian equivalence 
effects, consumption can increase permanently.  
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On the second point, lengthy court procedures should be shortened and out-of-court 
arrangements should be encouraged as alternatives. Currently, there are high legal 
discrepancies between countries. Such reforms would make it easier for banks to write off 
bad loans since it would increase the value of collateral provided by borrowers. 
Lastly, a liquid distress market would allow banks to connect with specialist investors who 
are experienced in managing impaired assets. That would allow them to write off their 
distressed assets quicker, and push them to expand their lending further. In some cases, a 
publically supported asset management company can help kick-off such a market. Spain’s 
SAREB is an example. In that instance, anticipating upcoming asset sales, its entry onto 
the market allowed banks to adjust their asset valuations and start selling NPLs. In turn, 
this attracted more investors and third-party loan servicers.  
These three pillars of reform are complementary and should be implemented 
simultaneously (Aiyar et al., 2015). 
4.4  FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTION 
There is an array of other measures that the ECB can undertake to loosen market 
conditions. One of them is a direct intervention in the foreign exchange market in order to 
devalue the EUR further and boost trade and foreign direct investment. Naturally, the 
central bank buys or sells its currency reserves in order to influence the value of the 
exchange rate directly. In practice, however, the current situation of a weakening EUR does 
not urgently call for this sort of intervention – strictly speaking. Said that, all such 
interventions would anyway have a further ‘signalling effect’ confirming ECB’s commitment 
to do “whatever it takes” to boost the real economy (see also Labonte, 2014).  
4.5  OTHER UNCONVENTIONAL MEASURES 
A practical option might be for the ECB to re-define its inflation target, in particular if we 
accept the idea that the euro area is entering a period of longer-term lower economic 
growth (or secular stagnation). The central bank could either change its definition in order 
to incorporate other price-movements apart from the consumer-led one, such as the retail 
price index (RPI), or it could lose the current inflation-target set at 2% in order to capture 
the rigidities arising from the new economic environment. The risk (not to be understated) 
of amending the definition of inflation under policy uncertainty is that inflation expectations 
might become de-anchored and credibility seriously undermined.4 Even in a scenario where 
the current expectations in the euro area are de-anchored, and settled at a level below 2%, 
a revision of the ECB’s official target might assist in re-anchoring them, in the light of the 
weaker economic conjecture. Overall, however, this may come at the cost of affecting 
central bank’s credibility as it may be seen, yet again, as a drastic change in the ECB’s 
policy stance in an attempt to cope with stubbornly low expectations. Considering that price 
stability defines the very ECB’s objective, and its political independence is considered 
conducive to maintaining price stability according to the target, making the ECB follow 
rather than lead market expectations (see Alesina and Stella, 2010) might affect the bank’s 
credibility. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Some would even argue that the current expectations in the Euro Area are already de-anchored 
such that these measures might assist in re-anchoring them. 
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5. IS THE ECB FACING A DILEMMA BETWEEN 
INTERVENTIONISM AND INDEPENDENCE? 
Notwithstanding some improvements in consumer sentiment and inflation expectations 
(particularly at shorter horizons), as discussed, the ECB is dispelling any prospects of QE 
early tapering at the moment.  With the latter decision of September 2015, the ECB is not 
attempting to violate the separation principle between standard and non-standard 
measures. On the contrary – due to the persistent clear downsize risks to price stability – 
creating an expectation for a withdrawal of the monetary accommodation further down the 
line is not unreasonable. Still the situation may change.  
During the recent periods, the ECB has constantly expressed concerns about its targeted 
inflation objective, clearly communicating how QE has the sole purpose of achieving the 
ECB’s mandated objectives, and explained how their actions would achieve these 
objectives. 
In Section 4, we highlighted how extending the QE programme indefinitely underscores the 
risk of a prolonged monetary policy easing in a conventional sense, or the “how long” 
scenario (see also Reza et al. 2015). The latter making exits strategies particularly relevant 
when the time will come (see Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2015a). A risk remains that, beyond 
a certain point, large-scale purchases of long-term government bonds may be 
misconstrued as an attempt to monetize large fiscal deficits, which has historically led to 
high inflation, with no effects on the real economy. 
Given the potential threats to central bank independence associated with the 
implementation of QE, it is clear that the latter has an “effective bound” (Reza et al. 2015). 
Nevertheless, where the ECB’s bound lies is still unclear.  
At the same time, it should be mentioned there are many potential elements that may put 
a “cap” on the size and duration of QE a priori: for instance people, as the result of the 
economic uncertainty, may react by wanting to inter-temporarily smooth the unwinding of 
the policy over time (by increasing precautionary savings, for instance). All in all, signalling 
correctly seems crucial at the moment. 
5.1  A TAXONOMY OF ECB’S UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICIES 
There is no doubt that narrow inflation targeting failed to deliver stability of the economic 
and financial system as a whole. Interventions like QE, usually requiring asset purchases, 
made the distinction between monetary and fiscal policy become blurred and put 
independence at risk. However, for the sake of focusing on the European QE’s stated 
purpose, i.e. bringing inflation on check, we should leave financial stability implications 
aside here (for a discussion see Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2015a).  
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Table 1: A taxonomy of unconventional monetary policies 
 Form of intervention Channels of propagation  Transmission Mechanism  
Market-based measures  Targeted asset purchases 
in private or sovereign 
debt markets  
Portfolio rebalancing  Changes in relative 
supplies affect asset 
prices and long-term 
interest rates, easing 
financing conditions  
Bank-based measures  Long-term refinancing 
operations (LTROs)  
Open market operations 
with full-allotment, 
longer maturity, extended 
number of counterparties, 
relaxed collateral 
requirements (acceptance 
of illiquid collateral)  
Money multiplier  Increased bank reserves 
stimulates bank lending  
Collateral channel High-quality collateral 
redirected to access 
market funding, restoring 
funding and market 
liquidity (including in 
collateral markets) 
Indirect portfolio 
rebalancing 
Activated if banks use 
central bank liquidity to 
purchase private or 
sovereign debt 
Source: Gabor (2012; 2014)  
Rather, it should be noted that in times of protracted recession and high debt, combined 
with a risk of deflation (i.e. as the current one) the temptation to resort to central banks’ 
facilities becomes high. In the name of growth, the recourse to “helicopter money” may be 
seen as the only solution (Bossone, 2014). The fundamental problem is the long-term cost 
associated with it: the potential loss of central bank’s independence and the political 
consequences of inflation (Blinder, 2010). 
Like other central banks in advanced economies, the ECB faced huge dilemma in finding a 
way out of the crisis. But in contrast to other central banks, the ECB had major constraints 
deriving from the complexity of the governance framework of the monetary union: one 
central bank and n Treasuries. In the jargon of game theory, the problem with this set-up 
is that the Member States’ fiscal authorities are better off if the ECB intervenes, obviating 
the need for fiscal intervention; likewise the ECB is better off if governments agree to use 
fiscal stimulus, in a coordinated fashion – as in a one country scenario (e.g., a fully-fledged 
fiscal union in the long term) – thus alleviating the pressure on the ECB (see Onorante, 
2007; Alcidi and Giovannini, 2013). 
With the implementation of QE, the ECB delivered its assessment of the situation and 
explained what response it intended to provide. Therefore, the ECB’s action in non-standard 
mode was based on a principle of separation between the interest rate policy and recourse 
to exceptional measures.5 In other words, this dilemma was addressed by reclaiming the 
importance of distinctive financial systems, defined through the traditional market-based 
and bank-based dichotomy (ECB, 2010).  
                                                          
5 The separation principle is a direct application of the Tinbergen Principle (1952) to the conduct of 
monetary policy. This framework, adapted to inflation targeting strategies, has been translated into 
monetary policy and liquidity management strategies, consistent with the ECB’s operational 
framework, where a distinction of this type is more appropriate (Smets, 2009). The ECB has clearly 
stated that it intends to maintain a clear separation between: 
(i) Monetary policy operations, signalling the appropriate level of short-term interest rates;  
(ii) Liquidity management operations, which main objectives is to keep money market rates close to 
the policy rate and to ensure money market well-functioning. 
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The former is determined by assessing the situation in terms of the price stability objective. 
The latter depends on the functioning of the transmission mechanism. Bank-based 
measures, exploited the flexibility of the existing framework, and were indeed not intended 
as an instrument for steering inflation (Table 2).  In contrast, the market-based 
unconventional measures were guided by financial or economic variables, for instance 
putting a ceiling on the yield of some peripheral long-term government bonds (see also 
Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004), as in the case of the Security Market Program, or, in the 
case of QE, with the broader goal of overcoming deflationary pressures. 
Table 2: The ECB's unconventional crisis policies 
 Nature of commitment  Interactions with funding markets 
Bank-based crisis measures (start date)  
Enhanced credit support  
(Oct 2008)  
Full-allotment, longer maturity (3 
to 6 months), relaxed collateral 
requirements  
Allow collateral substitution given 
sovereign collateral discrimination in 
European repo markets  
LTRO I (May 2009)  Three, one-year, LTROs  
June, Sept. and Dec. 09;  
Lengthen liquidity planning horizon 
(Trichet, 2009) and collateral 
substitution  
LTRO II (May 2010)  One, 6-months, LTRO (May 
2010)  
Address tensions in markets for 
collateral and possible contagion  
LTRO III (October 2011)  Two, one-year, LTROs (Oct. and 
Dec. 2011)  
Mitigate scarcity of eligible collateral 
and collateral discrimination. 
Temporary effect on Spanish and 
Italian yields.  
LTRO IV (Dec. 2011)  Two, three-year LTROs (Dec. 
2011 and Feb. 2012); relaxed 
collateral requirements  
Same as above 
Market-based crisis measures  
Covered Bond Program I (May 
2009 to June 2010) and II (Nov. 
2011 to Oct. 2012)  
Commitment to volumes  
CBPP I = EUR 60bn  
CBPP II = EUR 40bn  
(Hold to maturity)  
Lower cost of funding in the covered 
bond market, a long-term source of 
market funding for European banks  
Securities Market Programme 
(May 2010, suspended Jan. 2011; 
restored in July 2011, terminated 
with launch of OMTs)  
Sterilized, one-off purchases, no 
commitment to volume, no 
disclosure of originator of 
instrument.  
Restore liquidity in sovereign bond 
markets important for bank funding 
(collateral). Temporary effect. 
Outright Monetary Transactions 
(announced Aug 2012; not 
implemented) 
Unlimited amount, conditional to 
implementing an adjustment 
program under the ESM 
No intervention yet; strong signalling 
effect 
Expanded Asset Purchase 
Programme (EAPP) (January 
2015, until Sept. 2016; possibly 
extended until March 2017) 
1.14 EUR trillion (or 
about EUR 60 billion/month) in 
the first round 
Provide further monetary stimulus at 
the zero lower bound. 
Source: Adapted from Gabor (2012; 2014)  
As discussed, once the underlying objective has been achieved, the ECB will be confronted 
with the political economy aspects of unwinding extraordinary measures. Indeed, it should 
be noted how all the market crisis-based measured needed to be unwound at some point, 
leading the ECB to adopt several different measures (Table 2). 
It is important to point out that the intense criticism of the QE program for discouraging 
fiscal discipline rarely recognizes that sovereign bond purchases have been so far of a much 
smaller volume than bank-based liquidity injections (see Figure 16). Even so, the European 
QE has to be understood as part of a monetary policy strategy, not as an attempt at 
indirectly funding government. Said that, purchases will increase over time, making 
monetary-fiscal policy interactions very relevant. 
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Figure 16: Eurosystem ECB’s balance sheet (assets side) 
 
Source: Oxford Economics  
CONCLUSIONS 
Going back to the point made in Section 4.1, we believe QE must be accompanied by fiscal 
expansion for policy to succeed in stimulating aggregate demand and inflation: only fiscal 
action could guarantee that money would be spent. As Bossone notes (2014; 2015), in 
economies with large public debt, fiscal expansion would worsen the debt situation. Hence, 
the only way out would be for the central bank to commit to holding permanently the public 
debt purchased, so as to ‘sterilise’ its corresponding government and taxpayer obligations 
indefinitely. Although ECB liabilities will increase, the euro system as a whole will remain 
solvent (see also Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2015b). This set-up is currently not possible given 
the design of QE with limited risk-sharing (Buiter, 2015; Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2015b ; 
Blaszkiewicz-Schwartzman, 2015). 
Given the circumstances, the ECB did the right thing when it chose to intervene in 
buying government bonds, because the alternative of doing nothing would have 
been worse. But now the concern is: will limited risk-sharing be enough?  
 
As discussed, full risk sharing will not constitute a risk to the central bank’s credibility 
(Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2015b), and one should consider the potential costs of wanting to 
keep involvement limited, against the potential benefits.  
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